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Mathematics

What is the tragedy of the commons? Game theory, the prisoner's dilemma and imece

Why does a pasture open to everyone wear out so easily, while some communities protect their shared resources for centuries? We explain Hardin's idea, the prisoner's dilemma with a payoff table, the maths of repeated games and Elinor Ostrom's principles for managing shared resources.

By Kuazara Science TeamPublished: Updated: 10 min read

In this article · 10 sections
A simple geometric diagram on a dark background with two drawings: on the left a pasture circle divided into green slices with white dots around the slices, on the right a four-cell table with one cell filled in gold and purple rings in the other three

The theme of COP31’s 19 November is İmece: Enhancing Implementation (COP31 thematic days). İmece is the Turkish word for working together. This article uses maths to explain why acting together is both very valuable and hard.

The Turkish Language Association’s Current Turkish Dictionary defines imece in two senses: the carrying out of a village’s compulsory and voluntary work by the villagers through joint labour on equal terms, in rural communities; and many people gathering to do the work of one person or a community together, so that the jobs are finished in turn. What the two definitions share is an arrangement in which everyone gains from everyone’s contribution. But what happens if, instead of contributing, everyone chooses only to take?

Hardin’s pasture

In “The Tragedy of the Commons”, published in Science in 1968, the ecologist Garrett Hardin described this thought experiment: there is a pasture open to all. Each herder is thinking of adding one more animal to the herd.

  • The herder who adds the animal gets all of the gain from it.
  • The damage that extra grazing does to the pasture is shared among all the herders.

According to Hardin, every herder does the same sum and adds an animal; in the end the pasture is ruined. Hardin’s paper was mainly about population growth, but the phrase “tragedy of the commons” became a general idea describing the overuse of shared resources.

Let’s calculate: one more animal

Let’s build a simple model (the values are chosen to show the calculation). 10 herders use the pasture. One extra animal:

  • brings its owner a gain of +1 unit,
  • does 2 units of damage to the pasture in total; this damage is split equally among the 10 herders, so each bears 2÷10=0.22 \div 10 = 0.2 units.

One herder’s sum: if I add the animal, I gain +1−0.2=+0.8+1 - 0.2 = +0.8. Adding looks profitable.

If everyone does the same sum: each of the 10 herders adds one animal. Each herder gets +1 from their own animal but pays their share of the total damage of 10 animals: 10×0.2=210 \times 0.2 = 2. Net result: +1−2=−1+1 - 2 = -1. Everyone ends up worse off.

The community’s total: 10×(+1)−10×2=−1010 \times (+1) - 10 \times 2 = -10 units.

A decision that looks sensible for each individual leaves everyone worse off together. Game theory calls situations like this social dilemmas.

The prisoner’s dilemma

The most famous model of a social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the discovery of this game is usually attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, mathematicians working at the RAND Corporation after the Second World War; in early 1950 they had two colleagues play a game with this payoff structure 100 times in succession. The prison story is an illustration devised by Albert Tucker to explain the game.

There are two players; each chooses to cooperate (C) or defect (D). The scores used in the political scientist Robert Axelrod’s tournaments are as follows (the first number is your score, the second the other player’s):

Other COther D
You C3, 30, 5
You D5, 01, 1

Think from your side:

  • If the other cooperates: choosing C gives you 3, choosing D gives you 5. D is better.
  • If the other defects: choosing C gives you 0, choosing D gives you 1. D is better again.

Whatever the other does, defecting gets you more points. The other player reasons the same way, and both defect: each gets 1 point. Yet if both had cooperated, each would have got 3. The total score is 6 for mutual cooperation but only 2 for mutual defection.

A situation in which no player can increase their own payoff by changing their choice alone is called a Nash equilibrium. In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma the equilibrium is mutual defection; but this equilibrium is worse for both than cooperation.

What changes when the game is repeated?

In real life, herders, fishers and neighbours meet not once but for years. Today’s choice has a consequence tomorrow.

In the early 1980s Axelrod invited game theorists to submit computer programs that played the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the first tournament was won by a very simple strategy called tit for tat: cooperate in the first round, then copy your opponent’s previous move every round. The second tournament, whose entrants knew the results of the first, was also won by tit for tat, out of 63 programs. In their 1981 paper, Axelrod and Hamilton showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started and become established.

How much does the future matter? Let pp be the probability that the game continues for another round after each round. The encyclopedia calls this “the shadow of the future”. Against a tough strategy that says “if the other defects once, I will defect for ever”, the expected total from always cooperating is:

3+3p+3p2+⋯=31−p3 + 3p + 3p^2 + \dots = \frac{3}{1-p}

The expected total from defecting once and then being paid back is:

5+1⋅p+1⋅p2+⋯=5+p1−p5 + 1 \cdot p + 1 \cdot p^2 + \dots = 5 + \frac{p}{1-p}

Cooperation can be sustained if it is no worse than defecting:

31−p≥5+p1−p⇒3≥5(1−p)+p⇒p≥12\frac{3}{1-p} \ge 5 + \frac{p}{1-p} \quad\Rightarrow\quad 3 \ge 5(1-p) + p \quad\Rightarrow\quad p \ge \frac{1}{2}

In general, if the payoffs are TT (gained by defecting), RR (mutual cooperation) and PP (mutual defection), the condition is p≥T−RT−Pp \ge \dfrac{T-R}{T-P}; here 5−35−1=0.5\dfrac{5-3}{5-1} = 0.5. So if the chance of the game continuing is more than a half, keeping up cooperation pays better than defecting. The longer the shadow of the future, the easier cooperation becomes.

Ostrom: the tragedy is not inevitable

Hardin’s picture was widely accepted for a long time. The political scientist Elinor Ostrom, however, studied shared resources (pastures, forests, irrigation channels, fisheries) on the ground around the world. As she explained in her Nobel lecture, many had assumed that shared resources were owned by “no one” and that users could do nothing to protect them. Ostrom’s field studies showed that in many cases users could set their own rules and protect a resource for a long time.

In 2009 Ostrom shared the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Oliver Williamson, “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Ostrom demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user associations. According to the field studies, rules imposed from outside are seen as less legitimate and are broken more often, and monitoring works better when it is done by insiders.

One of the examples Ostrom studied comes from Antalya. In the inshore fishery at Alanya, described by the researcher Fikret Berkes in 1986, the fishers shared out named fishing spots by lot each season and moved between those spots in turn through the season. The fishers had set the rules themselves, and they themselves watched whether the rules were followed.

Eight principles of long-lasting commons

Ostrom looked for features shared by commons arrangements that had lasted for centuries, and in 1990 proposed eight design principles. According to the updated list in her Nobel lecture:

  1. Boundaries: who may use the resource, and the limits of the resource itself, are clear.
  2. Fit with local conditions: rules for use and contribution suit local conditions; what users take is in proportion to what they contribute.
  3. Collective choice: most people affected by the rules can take part in changing them.
  4. Monitoring: the state of the resource and the behaviour of users are monitored by people accountable to the users.
  5. Graduated sanctions: the response to someone breaking a rule increases with the seriousness and repetition of the breach.
  6. Conflict resolution: there are quick, low-cost ways to resolve disputes.
  7. Recognition of the right to organise: the users’ right to make their own rules is recognised by the government.
  8. Nested enterprises: when the resource is part of a larger system, governance is organised in nested layers.

In 2010 Cox, Arnold and Villamayor Tomás reviewed 91 studies that tested these principles and found them well supported empirically.

Most of the principles match what game theory says: monitoring and graduated sanctions reduce the payoff from defecting, while boundaries and long-term membership lengthen the “shadow of the future”.

The atmosphere can also be thought of as a resource shared by all of humanity: the benefit of emissions cut by one country, company or person spreads to everyone, while the cost stays with whoever makes the cut. This structure resembles the pasture calculation above. In a 2010 paper, Ostrom treated global environmental problems as a collective action problem too, and drew attention to governance that works at many levels together (polycentric governance), not just at a single global level.

Common mix-ups

“The tragedy of the commons is inevitable.” Ostrom’s field studies showed that many communities could protect shared resources for a long time with their own rules.

“The player who defects in the prisoner’s dilemma is selfish or bad.” The model is a payoff structure, not a moral judgement. In the one-shot game, defecting is the choice of any player who wants to maximise their score; the problem lies in the structure itself.

“Cooperation needs everyone to mean well.” In a repeated game, cooperation can sustain itself through reciprocity and the shadow of the future; well-designed rules strengthen this.

Try it yourself

  1. In the pasture model, let there be 20 herders and let the total damage of one extra animal be 2 units. What net gain does one herder calculate when adding an animal?
  2. In the same model, if all 20 herders each add one animal, what is each herder’s net result?
  3. In the prisoner’s dilemma, if the payoffs were T=4T = 4, R=3R = 3, P=1P = 1, what is the smallest pp for cooperation to last?

Answers: 1) 1−2÷20=+0.91 - 2 \div 20 = +0.9. 2) 1−20×0.1=−11 - 20 \times 0.1 = -1. 3) (4−3)÷(4−1)=1/3≈0.33(4 - 3) \div (4 - 1) = 1/3 \approx 0.33.

In short

  • The tragedy of the commons arises because, in a resource open to all, the individual gain is felt in full while the damage is shared.
  • In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma the equilibrium is mutual defection, which is worse for both players than cooperation.
  • When the game is repeated, cooperation can be sustained if the probability of continuing is p≥(T−R)/(T−P)p \ge (T-R)/(T-P).
  • Ostrom showed that users can manage shared resources with their own rules and proposed eight design principles.
  • İmece is the Turkish name for a cooperative arrangement in which everyone gains from everyone’s contribution.

You can study counting possible outcomes in our lesson Possible outcomes and probability in our lesson Experimental and theoretical probability. In the Lab figure Experimental probability, see for yourself how repeating an experiment many times changes the result. You can read how emissions are measured in How do you calculate a carbon footprint? and about a shared marine resource in What is Posidonia seagrass?

Frequently asked

4 questions

What is the tragedy of the commons?

It is the tendency to overuse a resource open to all, because each user gets the full gain from extra use while sharing the damage with everyone. Garrett Hardin described the idea with the example of a pasture in a paper published in Science in 1968.

What is the prisoner's dilemma?

It is a game in which two players choose between cooperating and defecting. Whatever the other does, defecting gives each player more points; but when both defect, both gain less than if both had cooperated.

How does cooperation last in a repeated game?

If the players will meet again, defecting today has a consequence tomorrow. If the probability p that the game continues for another round is greater than (T-R)/(T-P), keeping up cooperation pays better than defecting. Axelrod's tournaments were won by tit for tat, a strategy based on reciprocity.

What are Elinor Ostrom's principles for shared resources?

Clear boundaries, rules suited to local conditions, collective choice over rules, monitoring, graduated sanctions, ways to resolve conflict, recognition of users' right to organise and, for larger systems, nested layers of governance. Ostrom shared the 2009 Nobel memorial prize in economics for this work.

Sources

11 sources
  1. 1.COP31 Türkiye: Thematic days announced (opens in a new tab)cop31.tr
  2. 2.Turkish Language Association, Current Turkish Dictionary: imece (opens in a new tab)sozluk.gov.tr
  3. 3.Hardin (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859), 1243–1248 (opens in a new tab)doi.org
  4. 4.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Prisoner's Dilemma (opens in a new tab)plato.stanford.edu
  5. 5.Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science 211(4489), 1390–1396 (opens in a new tab)doi.org
  6. 6.Nobel Prize Outreach: The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009, press release and popular information (opens in a new tab)nobelprize.org
  7. 7.Ostrom (2009). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Nobel lecture) (opens in a new tab)nobelprize.org
  8. 8.Ostrom (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press (opens in a new tab)doi.org
  9. 9.Berkes (1986). Local-level management and the commons problem: A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries. Marine Policy 10(3), 215–229 (opens in a new tab)doi.org
  10. 10.Cox, Arnold and Villamayor Tomás (2010). A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management. Ecology and Society 15(4), 38 (opens in a new tab)ecologyandsociety.org
  11. 11.Ostrom (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. Global Environmental Change 20(4), 550–557 (opens in a new tab)doi.org
  • #game theory
  • #prisoner's dilemma
  • #common-pool resource
  • #Ostrom
  • #imece
  • #COP31

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